How Much Risk is the Treasury Really Assuming from the Financial Institutions?

Posted on April 7, 2009

What does it really mean to talk about saving “the banks”?  The Treasury would like us to have a mental picture of Jimmy Stewart in It’s a Wonderful Life, protecting the savings and mortgages of the good citizens of Bedford Falls.  In truth, for all material purposes, the current Public Private Investment Plan (PPIP) is about saving four mammoth financial institutions considered too big to fail, BankAmerica, Citicorp, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo.

These financial behemoths, each as large as a significant number of the world’s national economies, bear as much relationship to the Bedford Falls Building and Loan as a rowboat does to the Titanic.  For public consumption, however, it is convenient for the Treasury to continue to describe its efforts as a rescue of “the banks”;   rescuing hydra-headed financial giants just doesn’t have quite the same ring.  Additionally by lumping these institutions under the category of “banks” the Treasury can continue the fiction that the bailout is about “getting the banks lending again.”

Notwithstanding this fiction, as we showed last week, even Secretary Geithner has abandoned the pretense that the PPIP program is about encouraging direct bank lending in the traditional sense of taking deposits and making loans, admitting that the primary purpose of PPIP is to restore the strength of these wholesale institutions so that they can restart the private securitization markets that fueled the credit bubble earlier in the decade.  So here’s the plan.  Just remove the toxic assets from the books of the financial giants and the system will be restored to its former picture of robust health.  Hopefully the PPIP will be sufficient to fund the fix.  If not the Treasury can use its proposed new liquidation authority, invest few hundred billion dollars more to fill the gaps and sell the freshly minted “clean” institutions to the capital markets for a premium.

On its face this appears to many to be a rational bet.  With the survival of the financial system at stake, risking a few hundred billion more to clean up the banks would indeed be far less costly than another liquidity crisis like that surrounding the Lehman collapse.  Unfortunately this calculation omits one major element of risk that has the potential to increase the cost of the bailout beyond even the capacity of the Treasury to fund: i.e. the derivatives portfolios of the major banks.

Last week the Comptroller of the Currency – Administrator of National Banks issued its quarterly report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities – Fourth Quarter 2008.  In reviewing the report, several things become quickly apparent.

1.    Derivatives Trading is a really big business; the notional amount of all derivatives positions at all U. S. commercial banks and trust companies that participate in this business was slightly more than $200 Trillion on December 31, 2008.  That’s more than three times Gross World Product which the CIA estimates to have been a little over $62 Trillion in 2008.

2.    Over 93.7% ($188 Trillion) of this gross exposure was held by only four bank s, J. P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank and Goldman Sachs.  One institution, J. P. Morgan Chase, accounted for $87 Trillion of the total exposure or approximately 140% of Gross World Product.

3.    While the bulk of the exposure ($181 Trillion) was in the “traditional” derivatives markets, interest rate and FOREX swaps, almost $16 Trillion was in Credit Default Swaps, up from $1 Trillion in such transactions five years earlier.

4.    What had once been a very profitable business for the major banks, turned decidedly sour in 2008, with net reported trading losses of $836 million for the year as compared with profits of $5.5 Billion in 2007 and $18.8 Billion in 2006.  Drilling down to the details, Credit Default Swaps generated losses for the banks in 2008 of $12.6 Billion, more than offsetting gains for the year in Interest Rate and Foreign Exchange trading.

The OCC report provides a lengthy explanation as to why the notional amounts dramatically overstate the risk posed to the system by these contracts.  First, the real credit exposure is not the notional amount of the contract, but the amount that the market has moved from the strike price of the swap: i.e. the net amount the counterparty would be obligated to pay to true up the contract based on current market conditions.  This is referred to as the Gross Positive Value (GPV) of the contracts.  Since this GPV is in effect an unsecured claim against another financial institution, it represents a credit risk to the holder of the claims.  At yearend total GPV held by U. S. commercial banks was $7.1 Trillion.  Actual credit exposure was much lower, however, as the holders have the legal right to set off this exposure against certain of their counter exposures to the obligor institutions (Gross Negative Fair Values).

The netted credit exposure was estimated to be only $800 billion.  Added to this was Potential Future Exposure of $782 Billion based upon the amount by which the contracts could move in favor of the obligee banks to generate a Total Credit Exposure of $1.58 Trillion.  For the top five derivatives trading banks (the four above plus the U. S. operations of HSBC) total credit exposure averaged 489% of the institutions’ Risk Based Capital at the end of the fourth quarter.  At one bank, Goldman Sachs, credit exposure was more than 1000% of Risk Based Capital.  To be fair this calculation does not take into account pledged collateral backing a portion of the credit risks, which the OCC estimates as typical averaging 30-40% of the exposure amounts, so actual credit exposure was presumably somewhat lower.

By now your head may be swimming a little.  Mine certainly was as I worked to puzzle this out.  These are very large numbers.  Notwithstanding the OCC’s implication that all of this exposure is well managed and under control, I am reminded that we heard similar assurances with regard to subprime loans and CDOs, not to mention AIG’s Credit Default Swap portfolio.  The closest analog we can observe (AIG Financial Products) does not provide much comfort.  Apparently AIG FP had Credit Default Swap exposure of $440 Billion out of total derivatives exposure of $1.6 Trillion.  To date the AIG mess has cost the Treasury/Fed approximately $170 Billion to clean up.  With bank Credit Default Swap exposure in the aggregate reported at 36 times AIG’s CDS exposure, how much risk are the Treasury/Fed/FDIC actually assuming if they take on the unsecured debts of the big banks as they seem increasingly committed to do?  While I draw some comfort from the OCC’s explanation of netting and other factors limiting bank exposure on these volatile instruments, I am left with the nagging concern that there may ultimately be more risk here than meets the eye.   Absent more facts to the contrary, I’m reminded of the immortal words of Judy Garland as Dorothy Gale, “Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.”

What Does a Bonus Cost?

Posted on February 15, 2009

Consider this fable.

You’ve decided to invest $5 million in backing a champion at the new World Champion Poker Standoff. The rules are simple. Two players will play a winner takes all game of Texas Holdem. Each player will come to the table with a $5 million stake. You might ask why you would consider such an “investment”, but this is not all that different from the game the big banks have played in recent years.

Once in the game, you win a flip of a coin and are given first choice on hiring one of the two champions who will play in the tournament. The only information you are given is the following:

  • Player A wants an upfront cash salary of $400,000 plus a bonus equal to 50% of salary.
  • Player B requires no salary, but demands a bonus equal to 20% of his winnings.

Admittedly you’re missing some fairly important information such as who has the better track record and whether one of the players is a drunk or cocaine addict. But this is a fable after all so you’ve got to play by fable rules.

Given no more information than this, which player should you choose and how much will each player cost you if chosen. I would posit the following:

Player B is the only rational choice. Player A doesn’t have the courage of is convictions. Player B does. While this could be based on a totally unrealistic optimism on Player B’s part, it is more likely based on Player B’s realistic confidence that he will win. Assuming this is the case then the odds favor Player B and the likely cost of each player is as follows:

  • Player A costs $5,400,000 (Salary plus 100% loss of capital)
  • Player B generates a net profit of $4,000,000 ($5,000,000 winnings less $1,000,000 bonus)

The major banks in the U. S. (and the world for that matter) have participated in a hardly restrained speculative orgy for the past five to ten years. Under the new stimulus bill, bonuses of top earners at the major banks will be capped at 50% of salaries and must apparently be paid in restricted stock in institutions widely considered to be hopelessly insolvent and in which the equity and the options are likely to be worthless. In a culture where top performers have traditionally had the ability to earn bonuses of tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, this is going to cause some problems.

It’s easy to debate the merits of the old bonus plans, where even marginal performers have apparently been lushly rewarded, even when the institution itself lost money.  On the other hand no one can argue that, if the banks are going to continue to put massive financial positions (debt, derivatives, FOREX, etc.) at risk on a daily basis, billions of dollars at a time, there’s a pretty big premium on having good people in place to do the trading.

The big banks have ten of trillions of dollars of credit default swaps and other risk positions on their books. It’s not hard to picture recruiting calls going out from hedge funds and other trading firms not subject to the new law offering the best and brightest traders highly incentivized deals to move from the big banks to begin trading for these non-regulated firms. These traders will come armed with extensive knowledge of their former employers’ investment positions and will have every incentive to take advantage of that knowledge at the expense of their former employers and ultimately at the expense of the taxpayers who will likely soon own the big banks. And they’ll be trading against bank employees happy to take a comfortable salary and a 50% stock option bonus.

The stakes in this game aren’t millions, but trillions of dollars of taxpayer money. Odds are we just bet on the wrong champions.

SURVIVOR- Main Street America’s New Reality Show

Posted on November 13, 2008

Shading Denote Recession

Shading Denotes Recession

By now we know the story all too well. Sixteen strangers debark onto a jungle island and are told they must work together to survive. While they pretend they’re on the same team, from the start they scheme to position themselves to outlast the other contestants, because at the end of the day they know there will only be one SURVIVOR.

Every business leader in America (and the World for that matter) is anxious to understand the impact of the financial crisis on their own business and personal prospects. How bad is it going to be? Does the crash present new opportunities? What should I do now? And yes, “What must I do to survive?”

Based on conversations with our clients and with financial and strategic investors, many are choosing to “hunker down” and ride out the storm. For some firms this may be an appropriate course. Yet to make such a decision without a realistic evaluation of your firm’s financial survivability in light of the new circumstances would be shortsighted at best. Unless you have capital reserves sufficient to weather a very protracted (perhaps eighteen months or more) and severe downturn, your business could be at grave risk. And if you depend on leverage, this calculation must also take into account the potential impact of reduced loan availability and dramatically higher loan pricing, which may well come sooner than you expect.

What We Know

The U. S. economy is in the midst of what will likely be the worst recession in the postwar era. It appears that the decline is rapidly spreading around the world and that we may well experience a serious global recession that will dramatically affect even the (until now) rapidly developing economies of Asia and Latin America as well as the developed world. The effects of this recession are expected to impact the economy through much of 2009 and possibly beyond. While all eyes are now on housing, autos and consumer goods, which have rapidly declined in recent months, other industries will be impacted soon.

The financial crisis is far from over. The Treasury has put a Band-Aid on the banking industry with its $250 Billion preferred stock investment and the Fed has already provided over $1.5 Trillion dollars in new liquidity to the financial system worldwide to free up the frozen capital markets since March 2008, with much more to come. (For more information on the explosion of the Federal Reserve balance sheet see the excellent chart maintained by Cumberland Advisors here). To date the worldwide financial industry has experienced $684 Billion in losses from financial asset write downs, primarily from sub-prime and other improvidently granted mortgages and these losses have been replaced with $690 Billion in new capital (see chart here), from private investors, sovereign wealth funds and increasingly from government bailout investments in the U. S. and Europe.

What has not yet been addressed are a number of asset classes that have until now held up reasonably well, but which will almost certainly witness increasing write-offs in the coming months. These include:

  1. The leveraged loans that funded the buyout boom of 2004-2007
  2. Alt-A and even traditional mortgages that are increasingly under water as home prices continue to decline
  3. Credit cards
  4. Auto loans
  5. Land, Development and Construction loans
  6. Commercial real estate loans

Nouriel Roubini , among the most pessimistic, but also among the most accurate observers of the current economic scene, has recently predicted that, before the crisis is over, worldwide writedowns by the financial industry will total $2 Trillion. This almost guarantees a dramatic reduction in credit worldwide over the next 18-24 months.

In Q2 2008 total public and private debt in the United States was almost 3.6 times Gross Domestic Product, well over twice the level just prior to the Great Depression. By comparison this ratio was 2.6 ten years ago at the time of the world’s last major credit crisis.

debt-to-gdp1

(An excellent, but somewhat dated longer term chart of the same data from Ned Davis Research can be found here) Since then the U.S. financial system has created unprecedented levels of leverage, making the economy much more susceptible to economic shocks such as the one we are now experiencing. The current economic pain is not likely to end until this burdensome debt is significantly reduced in a process euphemistically called “deleveraging”.

So What Does this Mean for Me as a Business Owner?

Joseph Schumpeter, the great Austrian economist, popularized the idea of “creative destruction” as one of the great engines of progress inherent in the capitalist system. When you’re on the receiving end there is nothing creative about it. It’s just destruction. Just ask one of the thousand auto dealers expected to go out of business this year.

In the short term, one of the primary sources of pain for business owners will be the banks. The chart at the beginning of this article tells the story. From 2005-2007 loan terms and pricing, particularly at the higher end of the market were more liberal than at any other time in the past forty years. The chickens have now come home to roost and we are witnessing a dramatic tightening of loan terms and a sharp increase in pricing. Loan covenants that permitted debt to cash flow ratios of 4-4.5 times will be renegotiated at 2-2.5 times or less; and pricing spreads are currently jumping two to three hundred basis points. This trend will continue, notwithstanding all of the government’s efforts to force easing. Even more conservatively financed businesses will feel the heat as banks, desperate to improve their risk ratios, squeeze those customers most able to adjust to make up for those that cannot. Companies that are unprepared for the onslaught are at extreme risk over the next six to twelve months.

Given the current challenges, many businesses will not survive. We are already witnessing a dramatic increase in business bankruptcy filings and this is just the tip of the iceberg. Additionally many other firms will be forced into shotgun mergers as the only alternative to outright failure. To avoid becoming road kill in the panic, companies must act now.

Action Plan for Survival

Deleveraging is going to occur whether or not you plan for it. At the individual business level, deleveraging can come about in several ways:

The Extreme

  1. Repudiation. In America the primary tool for business debt repudiation is Chapter 11 and it’s not pretty.
  2. Negotiation. Many creditors understand the value destruction inherent in bankruptcy and are willing to make concessions on the theory that something is usually better than nothing. Often such negotiations will encompass conversions of existing debt into equity ownership, the essence of deleveraging.

The Practical

  1. Some firms, particularly those that did not succumb to high levels of leverage during the boom, will weather the storm without radical surgery. For those that remain profitable, ongoing accumulation of retained earnings and repayment of debt will reduce leverage over time.
  2. Even those companies in comparatively good condition must review their current operations and act aggressively to eliminate all unnecessary expenditures.
  3. Non-core or less productive assets and businesses can be sold to further reduce leverage and build up a reserve for opportunities ahead. Once these disposition opportunities are identified, the owners should act quickly. This is not the time to hold out for top dollar. Values are likely to decline further and those who delay may later find themselves selling the family jewels to survive.

The Necessary

  1. If a careful evaluation of your company’s financial position leads to the conclusion that your current financing arrangements are not adequate to weather the storm, you should consider raising additional capital as soon as possible. The market for junior (mezzanine) capital remains strong for good companies with proven cash flow, though more expensive than a year ago. Additionally many banks, particularly community and regional firms that did not get involved in sub-prime lending, are still seeking loans and asset based lenders are available to fill the gap for companies that have strong collateral but an earnings hiccup that makes them unattractive to the banks. Even if you don’t suspect that your bank will pull the plug at renewal time, now is the time to begin looking for alternatives, just in case.
  2. Sometimes, after a realistic evaluation of your situation, you may conclude that your firm’s chances of surviving a deep downturn are slight. If that is the case, sale of the business may well be the best alternative. Consolidation is the watchword in M&A today. Larger, better capitalized, firms will see opportunities to improve their market position through geographical or product line growth. Often these firms can generate profitability, even from acquisition of a money-losing operation at a price in excess of liquidation value, through elimination of duplicative functions and expenditures. Such a sale may not achieve an exit at the price levels seen in 2006-2007, but today’s price will be far better than can be obtained later, after the seller’s operations have felt the full impact of the recession. In any case a sale today trumps a likely bankruptcy somewhere down the road.

The Home Run

  1. Tomorrow’s success stories are often born in tough times like these. If your company has financial strength and superior operational capability, now is the time to jump ahead of the pack. Companies will be available for acquisition that you could never have dreamed of buying in the boom, often at distressed prices. Now is the time to put in place an aggressive program to reach out to the market and see what’s available. And unlike in the boom years, you are less likely to be faced with crazily priced auctions and the need to act before you have a chance to do your due diligence. If you play your cards right, you may even be looked upon as a White Knight, ready and willing to lend a hand to companies in a less fortunate situation (but of course at a great price and on favorable terms).
  2. If you’ve got the skills to grow, but not the bucks, private equity continues to be a good source of the growth capital you will need. Now is the time to establish alliances with potential backers, so that you will be ready to act when the opportunities come along.

At the end of the season there will be only one SURVIVOR, but there will be fifteen losers. You’re now playing in the toughest game of your business life. Which one will you be?

Downloadable PDF.

In For a Penny, In for a Pound

Posted on November 10, 2008

AIG announced today a deal with the Federal Reserve that will have the effect of increasing the Fed’s bailout financing to AIG from $85 Billion to in excess of $167 Billion (and most likely counting).  Any seasoned distressed company investor knows that the first new money put into any failing company is likely to be lost unless the investor is prepared to follow the initial investment with a lot more (sometimes referred to as “good money after bad”).  More than one wag has described this phenomenon as “the second mouse gets the cheese”.

The other big economic news of the day revolved around the proposed bailout of General Motors.  Clearly something is likely to happen here with three million jobs at stake and a lot of political power in play with the United Auto Workers.  Given the inevitable, wouldn’t it make more sense if the money comes in as part of a pre-packaged Chaper 11 which cleans up the company’s balance sheet before the money comes in?

I’ve never seen a successful turnaround that keeps the old, failed management on board to steer the sinking ship.  Perhaps it would make more sense to put together an ownership group that includes some Japanese auto manufacturing skill as well as some of the best business  minds in America.  Toyota, Honda, et. al. clearly know something about running a successful auto plant and they are not afraid of investing in the United States.  And Steve Jobs seems pretty successful at creating a consumer products company.  Let’s harness the best we’ve got to create real change in this vital industry, not subsidize the failures of the past.

James Futterknecht Interview

Posted on March 26, 2008

This is an archived interview from DealCast, the predecessor blog to Capital Matters.  James Futterknecht is one of the pioneers of the private equity industry and, in this interview, he shares instructive insights as to the development of his firm, Hammond Kennedy & Co., Inc.